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The structural integrity of a dual-purpose metal cask currently under development by the
Korea Radioactive Waste Agency (KORAD) was evaluated, through numerical simulations
and a model test, under high-speed missile impact reflecting targeted aircraft crash con-
ditions. The impact conditions were carefully chosen through a survey on accident cases
and recommendations from literature. In the impact scenario, a missile flying horizontally
hits the top side of the cask, which is freestanding on a concrete pad, with a velocity of
150 m/s. A simplified missile simulating a commercial aircraft engine was designed from
an impact loadetime function available in literature. In the analyses, the dynamic behavior
of the metal cask and the integrity of the containment boundary were assessed. The
simulation results were compared with the test results for a 1:3 scale model. Although the
dynamic behavior of the cask in the model test did not match exactly with the prediction
from the numerical simulation, other structural responses, such as the acceleration and
strain history during the impact, showed very good agreement. Moreover, the containment
function of the cask survived the missile impact as expected from the numerical simula-
tion. Thus, the procedure and methodology adopted in the structural numerical analyses
were successfully validated.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society. This
is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Safety assessment against an aircraft crash has been an
important issue in the design of facilities with hazardous
materials such as nuclear power plants [1,2]. For accidental
aircraft crashes, the probability of a crash is calculated, and itsLee).
sevier Korea LLC on beha
mons.org/licenses/by-ncconsequences are selectively evaluated for those facilities
with significant crash probabilities. Facilities sited far enough
from the airport and airplane routes have been exempted
from the requirements for a detailed assessment of the con-
sequences of an aircraft crash. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
the issue of aircraft crash into safety-important facilities,lf of Korean Nuclear Society. This is an open access article under
-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1 e Concept drawing of a dual-purpose metal cask without impact limiters.
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ubiquitous. In many aspects, the conditions for a targeted
aircraft crash are different from those for accidental crashes
and tend to be more severe. Recently, the United States Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) revised regulation 10 CFR
50.150 [3,4] to include the requirements for a safety assess-
ment against a targeted aircraft crash for the licensing of
newly introduced nuclear power plants. In addition to nuclear
power plants, many countries have performed safety assess-
ments of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage facilities against
targeted aircraft crashes using numerical simulations and
tests. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) analyzed
the effect of targeted aircraft crashes into nuclear power plant
containment buildings, SNF storage pools, dry storage facil-
ities, and SNF transportation casks [5]. Thomauske [6] pre-
sented the analyses results of the mechanical and thermal
impacts caused by a targeted aircraft crash on SNF interim
storage buildings and storage casks inside the buildings. Ste-
pan et al [7] analyzed the consequences of a large commercial
aircraft crash into an interim storage building. They built a
computer model of the impacting aircraft to consider various
angles and locations of impact. Shirai et al [8] performed nu-
merical analyses and tests considering an aircraft engine
crash into ametal caskwith an impact velocity of 60m/s. Theydeveloped an evaluation model for the integrity of the bolted
closure of themetal cask and validated themodel under high-
speed impact conditions.
In Korea, the safety assessment of nuclear power plants
against aircraft crashes has been performed using numer-
ical simulations, but very few studies have been conducted
to evaluate the safety of SNF storage systems or facilities.
In addition, efforts to verify the simulation results for
aircraft crashes using tests have yet to be reported. In this
research, the safety assessment of a dual-purpose metal
cask (DPMC) under development by the Korea Radioactive
Waste Agency (KORAD) was performed using numerical
simulations and model tests. A scenario of a targeted
aircraft crash was established from a literature survey, and
the impact conditions were derived from the scenario. The
verification of the methodology used in the numerical
simulation was performed through a comparison of the test
and simulation results. However, it should be noted that
the results of the assessment in this study are not
conclusive as the cask is still under development and the
design is subject to change. Moreover, the impact condi-
tions considered in this research do not reflect the stand-
point of Korean competent authorities on the issue of
targeted aircraft crashes.
Fig. 2 e Simplified scale model of a dual-purpose metal cask without impact limiters.
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2.1. Metal cask for SNF storage
The SNF storage system considered in this research is a DPMC
that is under development by KORAD, the exclusive organi-
zation in Korea responsible for radioactive waste manage-
ment. It consists of a welded canister with a spent fuel basket
and ametal cask with one closure lid. Fig. 1 shows the concept
drawing of the DPMC without impact limiters. To simplify the
simulation and tests, a scale model of the original cask was
designed as shown in Fig. 2. The scale factor was 1/3, and the
spent fuel basket and spent fuel assemblieswere replaced by a
dummy weight with the same mass and similar stiffness.Table 1 e Similarity law adopted in this work.
Parameter Full scale Scale model
Basic dimensions
Length 1 SL
Time 1 SL
Mass 1 S3L
Force 1 S2L
Stress, strain 1 1
Test conditions
Impact velocity 1 1Table 1 explains the similarity law adopted in this work [9].
When the scale factor is given as SL (< 1), the basic parameters
and test conditions are determined as in the right-most col-
umn of the table. In this similarity law, the stress and strain in
the test model are expected to be the same as those in the full
scale model.
The neutron absorbers and neutron shieldingwere omitted
in the design of the simplified model. The cask and dummy
weight are made of carbon steel A516 Gr. 70, and the canister
is made of stainless steel A240 Type 304. The total weight of
the 1:3 scale model is 3,578 kg, and its diameter and height are
700 mm and 1,800 mm, respectively.
2.2. Impact conditions
The scenario of the targeted aircraft crash was established
based on regulation 10 CFR 50.150 [2] and a Nuclear Energy
Institute (Washington, DC, USA) report [5]. A Boeing 747 (B747),
a large commercial aircraft frequently flown over Korea, was
considered as the impacting aircraft, and the impact velocity
was set at 150 m/s, which was the measured velocity of the
airplane that struck The Pentagon (Washington, DC, USA)
during the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In general, the impact ve-
locity should be determined considering the maneuverability
of the aircraft based on factors such as the size of the target
system, topography around the site, and skill of the pilot. As
Fig. 3 e Illustration of impact condition. DPMC, dual-
purpose metal cask.
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Pentagon, the impact velocity of 150m/smight not be realistic.
However, it is the only available data of a real targeted aircraft
crash into a low-profile building. Moreover, because the DPMCFig. 4 e Procedure for designiis much smaller than The Pentagon, it is believed that the use
of the impact velocity of 150 m/s is on the conservative side.
The impact orientation is another important factor to be
determined in an aircraft crash scenario. As mentioned by the
Nuclear Energy Institute [5], themost-severe impact condition
is the direct impact of the aircraft engine with the centerline
of the DPMC. In our research, the engine of a B747 hits the
upper part of the DPMC, which is free standing on a concrete
pad. It was expected that this impact condition would incur
the most-severe shear damage to the containment boundary
with a bolted closure. The impact condition is illustrated in
Fig. 3.
After the first impact of the aircraft engine with the cask,
there are several possible scenarios that can lead to the
deterioration of the integrity of the metal cask such as the
secondary impacts with other casks and structures, fire from
the aircraft fuel, and gas explosion due to the impact [10]. All
those scenarios are relevant and should be considered for a
complete evaluation of the effects of aircraft impact and
related risks. However, only the mechanical effect of the first
impact to the cask is analyzed and discussed in this paper.ng the simplified missile.
Fig. 5 e Dynamic behavior of cask after impact.
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Fig. 6 e Finite element models of a dual-purpose metal
cask and missile for detailed analysis.
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A simplified missile simulating the engine of a B747 was
designed. It was reported by Shirai et al [8] that the engine
weighs about 4.5 tons and the effective impact diameter isFig. 7 e Finite element model of lid cloabout 1.4 m. In addition, the impact loadetime function pro-
posed by Shirai et al [8] andmodified according to scale theory
[9] was utilized in the design of the simplified scale model of
the engine. The impact loadetime function provided in the
literature was from an impact at a velocity of 60 m/s onto a
rigid wall. Therefore, the reference loadetime function was
scaled down based on scale theory; the time was scaled down
by a factor of 1/3, and the load was scaled down by a factor of
(1/3)2. The dimensions of the simplified missile were then
determined such that the loadetime function of the designed
missile from an impact onto a rigid wall at 60m/s velocity was
as close to the reference function as possible. The procedure is
depicted in Fig. 4. The simplified missile, which weighed
167 kg and had a diameter of 355 mm, was made of carbon
steel. The diameter of themissile was not exactly scaled down
from the effective impact diameter by a factor of 1/3 because
355 mm was the maximum allowable diameter that could be
fired by the test equipment.3. Numerical simulations
The numerical simulations were performed in two steps. As
the cask was not firmly supported but was free standing on asure of dual-purpose metal cask.
Fig. 8 e Dynamic material property of A240 Type 304
stainless steel.
Fig. 10 e Stress contours at 3 milliseconds after impact.
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expected. Thus, the first step of the simulation utilized a
simplemodel to examine the impact behavior of the cask for a
long duration of up to 2 seconds. This is very important when
the subsequent impacts of the cask, such as collisions with
other casks, are of concern. However, the evaluation regarding
the secondary impacts is not discussed in this paper. The
second step of the simulation utilized a detailed model to
evaluate the structural response of the cask components at
the instant of missile impact. Moreover, the behavior of the
bolted lid closure was carefully analyzed to checkwhether the
containment function of the cask was maintained or not.0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
0.0
Time (s)
Fig. 11 e Time histories of lid opening and sliding
displacements.3.1. Dynamic analysis with a simplified model
In the simplified analysis, the cask was modeled as an empty
cylinder made of an artificial material with the same stiffness
as the cask body material and a calculated density to match
the total weight of the model to the actual value, 3,578 kg. TheFig. 9 e Application of bolt pretension using dynamic relaxation.
Fig. 12 e Fabricated test models. (A) Cask body, (B) canister, (C) dummy weight, and (D) missile.
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mesh so that the buckling behavior of the missile shell could
be realized in the simulation. The concrete pad and founda-
tion were modeled using rigid elements fixed to the ground.
The numerical simulation was performed by LS-DYNA, and
the results showed that the cask gained significant angular
velocity as well as translational velocity in the direction of
impact, as shown in Fig. 5. It was determined that the cask
would land on the concrete pad after traveling about 11 m in
the air, and the residual translational velocity in the direction
of the impact was calculated as 11.4 m/s.Fig. 13 e Strain gauge installation on the canister.3.2. Dynamic analysis with a sophisticated model
In the second step of the simulation, the main objective was to
examine the integrity of the containment of the cask at the
instant of impact. A half model of the DPMC was constructed
using about 300,000 finite elements, as shown in Fig. 6, and the
containment boundary was modeled with sufficient accuracy,
as shown in Fig. 7. The cask body was mainly modeled using
linear hexagonal elements, whereas the impactingmissile was
modeled with shell elements. The concrete pad and the foun-
dation were modeled using rigid elements as in the simplified
analysis. Dynamic material properties considering the strain
rate effect were utilized in the modeling of the cask body,
canister, and missile. The material properties were obtained
from tests using three different testing machines, namely a
quasi-static tensile testmachine, a high-speedmaterial testing
machine, andaHopkinsbar testingmachine.Thedataobtained
using thedifferent testersweremanipulated intoa tabular form
that could be used in LS-DYNA with the piecewise-linear plas-
ticity model. Fig. 8 shows the stressestrain curves used in the
simulation for A240 Type 304 stainless steel. To simulate the
bolt pretention, a dynamic relaxation method was utilized as
shown in Fig. 9. The value of the bolt pretension was 70 MPa,
which corresponds to a strain of 30 m in the bolt stud.
Fig. 10 shows the stress contours in the model at 3 milli-
seconds after impact. For the evaluation of the containment
integrity, the procedure proposed in NUREG/CR-6672 by San-
dia National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, USA [11] was fol-
lowed. Two adjacent nodes lying on the location of O-ring and
closest to the nearby bolt were chosen, one on the lid (Node A
in Fig. 7) and the other on the cask body (Node B in Fig. 7). The
relative displacements of the two nodes were then monitored
during the simulation to measure the opening and sliding
displacements of the lid with respect to the cask body. The
number of node pairs monitored was the same as the number
of bolts. Among all the pairs, the biggest opening of the lid was
observed at the pair closest to the impact point on the cask
body. Fig. 11 shows the time histories of the cask lid opening
and sliding displacements at this location during impact. It
was observed that the cask suffered significant shear defor-
mation in the lidecask connection, but the lid opening
displacement remained within a small range, and the bolt
Fig. 14 e Strain gauge installation on the cask body (0 and 180 in circumferential direction, 270 in vertical and
circumferential directions, and B13 bolt strain gauge).
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0.2 mm, which was interpreted as 0.6 mm in the full-scale
model. This value is much smaller than the elastic recovery
range of the O-ring used in the DPMC, but it should be noted
that the aging of the O-ring was not considered in this eval-
uation. From the results it can be concluded that the
containment is damaged during the first impact by themissile
but the containment function is maintained.4. Verification test
4.1. Test procedure and preparation
To perform the verification test, the scale models of the DPMC
and missile were fabricated as shown in Fig. 12. TwentyFig. 15 e Locations of accelerometer installation.channels of strain gauges and two channels of accelerometers
were installed, and the locations of these sensors are depicted
in Figs. 13e15. The strain gauges were installed on the inside
surface of the canister, outside surface of the cask, canisterFig. 16 e The moment of impact (3 milliseconds after the
first contact).
Fig. 17 e Dynamic behavior of cask after impact.
Fig. 19 e Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) graph of acceleration
data. FFT, Fast Fourier Transform.
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The accelerometers were installed at the center of the lid in
the direction of impact, which is from 90 to 270 with the
missile hitting the surface of cask at 90. Before the test, the
containment integrity of the cask was checked using helium
mass spectroscopy according to ANSI (American National
Standard Institute) N14.5 [12].
During the test, the impact velocity of the missile was
measured by a muzzle velocity radar system, and a high-
speed camera recorded the images of the impact. The data
from the high-speed camera was used to confirm the impact
velocity measured by the radar system. After the test, the
helium mass spectroscopy was performed again to check the0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
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Fig. 18 e Acceleration history measured at the cask lid.containment integrity of the cask, and then the conditions of
cask components, such as the lid bolts, were examined.
4.2. Test results
The test was performed at the testing site of the Agency of
Defense Development (ADD) in 2011. The missile was fired
using a Counter Mass Gun (CMG), and the velocity of the
missile was measured as 148 m/s. The behavior of the cask
after impact is shown in Figs. 16 and 17. Unlike in the nu-
merical simulation, the cask did not gain significant vertical
momentum from the impact and tumbled in the direction of
impact almost horizontally. The first landing point of the cask
on the concrete pad was about 3.3 m away from the initial
standing point, which ismuch smaller than the 11m expected
from the simulation. This discrepancy was a result of
modeling errors related to the concrete pad and the founda-
tion (soil and sand). The actual foundation had considerable
flexibility and could absorb a significant amount of mo-
mentum and energy by itself, whereas this effect was
neglected in the numerical simulation in which the founda-
tion wasmodeled as a rigid body. Furthermore, in the test, the
horizontal translational velocity of the cask after impact was
calculated as 8.8 m/s from an analysis of the high-speed im-
ages, whereas it was calculated as 11.4 m/s in the numerical
simulation. This discrepancy was also mainly due to the
insufficient modeling of the caskepadefoundation interac-
tion, whichwill be improved in our future research. Themajor
reason why the foundation was modeled as a rigid body is the
lack of property data of soil and sand. In our future work, an
inverse engineering approach will be taken to find the
appropriate property values of those that minimize the
discrepancy of the simulation and test results.
After the test, the containment integrity of the cask and
canisterwere checked using heliummass spectroscopy. It was
found that the cask lid closure suffered considerable damage
with about half of the bolts loosened, but the leak rate was
kept under the allowable range. Thus, the conclusions from
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Fig. 20 e Filtered acceleration data by sixth order Butterworth filter (low pass). (A) Cut-off frequency 1,000 Hz. (B) Cut-off
frequency 500 Hz.
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Fig. 21 e Strain history measured on the canister lid.
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Fig. 23 e Strain history measured on the cask lid (0e180).
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quantitiesmeasured during the test, such as the accelerations
and strains at important locations on the cask were also
compared with the predicted histories from the numerical
simulation (Figs. 18e25). The strain data show very good
agreements while the acceleration data shows some0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
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Fig. 22 e Strain history measured on the cask body.discrepancy in terms of magnitude and phase of the peak. To
analyze this discrepancy, a fast Fourier transform was per-
formed as shown in Fig. 19. The test data shows a very clear
peak around the 10,000 Hz range but this is not shown as clear
and strong in the simulation data. Rather, the simulation data0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
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Fig. 24 e Strain history measured on the cask lid (90e270).
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Fig. 25 e Strain history measured on the bolt located at 90.
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domain and these are believed to be numerical noises. Once
those noises are removed by applying a low pass filter, the
comparison becomes easier as shown in Fig. 20. The cut-off
frequencies, 500 and 1,000 Hz, were chosen low enough to
isolate the signals of rigid body acceleration of the cask from
those of vibration, stress wave, as well as high frequency
numerical noises. The trend of signals with respect to the
change of cut-off frequency are well demonstrated in the
figure. The simulation data and test data show a similar trend
but a different peak acceleration value and time to reach the
peak. In the numerical simulation data, only the horizontal
component of acceleration is plotted in Fig. 18 for comparison,
although there exists vertical component acceleration of sig-
nificant magnitude. This is one of the causes of the difference
in the acceleration magnitudes of the simulation and the test.
The cause of this discrepancy will be studied more in detail in
our future work. Some of the strain data also show numerical
instability after some time as in Fig. 24 and this is also a topic
which needs more investigation.5. Conclusions
A safety assessment of a spent nuclear fuel storage cask
against an aircraft engine crash was performed using numer-
ical simulation. A commercially available explicit finite
element code was utilized for the dynamic simulation, which
was performed in two steps to examine the dynamic behavior
of the cask and the detailed structural responses of the cask
components. The simulation results using a detailed model
showed good agreement with the test results, successfully
verifying the procedure and methodology used in the numer-
ical simulation. In our future research, it will be endeavored to
minimize the discrepancy between the simulation and the test
regarding the dynamic behavior of the cask after impact.
Because the information on targeted aircraft crashes, such
as conditions of assessment and detailed analysis results, are
classified in many countries, it is not easy to gather sufficient
information for the assessment. One difficulty lies in theaccurate modeling of the aircraft structure. In our research,
the loadetime function proposed by Shirai et al [8] was uti-
lized to design a simulated aircraft engine, but it is believed
that there is room for improvement in design of the impacting
missile. Moreover, the evaluation in our work focused on the
mechanical impact on the cask by themissile at the instant of
collision. However, the subsequent events following the first
impact, such as collisions with other casks and fire due to
aviation fuel, should be assessed for a complete evaluation of
the consequences of an aircraft crash. Those evaluations are
considered as our future research topics.
It is noted that this is the first test activity considering an
aircraft crash in Korea, and the conditions of assessment in
this work do not reflect the standpoint of the Korean compe-
tent authorities.Conflicts of interest
All authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.
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